Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Tom Polk and Ron Shultz v. Mike T. Ivers : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian M. Barnard; Attorney for Appellants.
J. Harold Call; Attorney for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Shultz v. Ivers, No. 14682.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1566

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN

THE

SUPREME
OF

STATE

COURT

THE
OF

UTAH

TOM POLK and RON SHULTZ,
Plaintiffs

and A p p e l l a n t s ,

vs

Case No. 14682
HIKE T. IVERS and
MRS. MIKE T. IVERS, bis wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

AN APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

J.. HAROLD CALL
30 North Main Street
Number Three
Heber City, Utah 84032
Attorney for Respondents
i
Iwna

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

UU3B

AUG 2 3 1976

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utali
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN

THE

SUPREME
OF

STATE

COURT

THE
OF

UTAH

TOM POLK and RON SHULTZ,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
vs
Case No. 14682
MIKE T. IVERS and
MRS. MIKE T. IVERS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

AN APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

J. HAROLD CALL
30 North Main Street
Number Three
Heber City, Utah 84032
Attorney for Respondents

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

3

NATURE OF THE CASE

5

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

6

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

ARGUMENT . .

9

Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

9

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
WITH PREJUDICE
CONCLUSION

. . . . . . .

13
14

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Brasher Motor v. Bro-wn, 23 Utah 2d 247,
461 P.2d 464 (1969)

11

Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975)

11

Thompson Ditch Company v. Jackson,
29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528(1973). . . .

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Larsen,
— 5 4 4 P.2d 876 (1§75)

9

CONSTITUTION

Utah Constitution, Article I, §11. . . .

13

STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated, (1953)
Section 78-12-5.

13

Section 78-12-25

13

Section 78-12-26

13

RULES

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b). . . . . . 9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN

THE

SUPREME
OF

STATE

COURT

THE
OF

UTAH

TOM POLK and RON SHULTZ,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
vs
Case No. 14682
MIKE T. IVERS and
MRS. MIKE T. IVERS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action, brought by Appellants, seeks damages
for forcible entry and forcible detainer and for damage
caused to the Plaintiffs' personal property by actions of
the Defendants.
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i

II
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court granted the Defendants' Motion

'

to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Defendants'
Counterclaim for lack of prosecution.
4
III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

i
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the lower
court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Complaint and a remand
of the action to the lower court for trial.

IV
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose from a landlord-tenant dispute
between Plaintiffs and Defendants.

The Plaintiff lessees

filed a complaint in forcible entry against the Defendant
landlords on January 22, 1974 in Third District Court in
Salt Lake City, Utah.(R.l)

Service was made upon both

Defendants the following day.(R.7)

Defendants through

counsel, Wendell R. Jones, answered on February 6, 1974.(R.11)
Plaintiffs submitted a first set of interrogatories on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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informed the Court by letter filed December 9, 1975 that he

f

would not be able to attend and that he would be amenable
for trial anytime during February or March, 1976.(R.90)
Defendants1 counsel did not appear in court or otherwise
notify the court of a convenient date.

1

The minute entry

reflects that the court would contact counsel and set a
trial date.(R.91)

No further action was taken until Defendants

*

moved for dismissal for failure to prosecute on June 1,
1976.(R.94)
that time.

No notice of hearing on the motion was made at
Nevertheless, the court without a hearing, and

with no counsel present granted the motion on June 7, 1976
and requested Defendants1 counsel to prepare an order of
dismissal.(R.96)

Plaintiffs' counsel received a copy of the

proposed order on June 9, 1976 (R.96) and requested Defendants1
counsel for a hearing before the order was signed, which
hearing was set for June 21, 1976.(R.97)

On June 14, 1976

Plaintiffs1 counsel filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the liability issue.(R.98)

At the June 21, 1976

hearing, Plaintiffs1 counsel was not present but informed
the court by telephone he would not appear and that he would
submit the matter on the record.

Despite the motion for

partial summary judgment filed a week earlier, the extensive
discovery completed by Plaintiffs and the irregularity of
the June 7, 1976 proceeding, the court, Judge Stewart M.
Hanson, presiding, dismissed Plaintiffs1 complaint with
prejudice for want of prosecution.(R.101)

Timely appeal was
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9

taken.(R.104)

V
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE,

The court below had the power under Rule 41(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Plaintiffs'
action for want of prosecution.

The issue is whether the

court abused its discretion in doing so in this case.

When

faced with a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution a
court must weigh three separate and often conflicting interests:
1)

the interest of the Plaintiff in having
his claim heard on its merits

2)

the interest of the Defendant in being
protected from vexatious delays and possible
impairment of his defenses by the passage of
time, and

3)

the interest of the court in eliminating
"deadweight" cases from its docket.

Plaintiffs1 position is that the court below arbitrarily
sacrificed their fundamental right to a judicial hearing to
less compelling interests which could have been adequately
protected by far less stringent sanctions than dismissal.
In Westinghouse Electric Supply v Larsen 544 P.2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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876(1975) this Court emphasized the primacy of a party's
right to be heard:
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in
order to keep them up to date. But it is even
more important to keep in mind that the very
reason for the existence of courts is to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do
justice between them . . . It is our conclusion
that the trial court failed to give proper weight
to the higher priority; and that under the circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal
was an abuse of discretion.
The Westinghouse case stands for the proposition that a
dismissal for want of prosecution is not to be granted
unless there are interests substantially outweighing the
Plaintiffs' right to be heard.

What are the interests in

the case at bar.
No significant harm to the Defendants appears from
the record.

Any neglect by Plaintiffs' counsel could not

possibly have harmed the Defendants more than the Defendants'
failure to conduct any form of discovery recognized under
the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, any other interests

the Defendants might have had clearly were not significant
factors in Judge Hanson's decision, since the court originally
granted Defendants' motion without a hearing.
Justification for the lower court's ruling must be
found, if at all, in its power to weed out "deadweight"
cases from its calendar.

Was this case "deadweight"?

Several facts point to a negative answer.

First, Plaintiffs

had filed a motion for summary judgment on June 14, 1976
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R.98) - one week before Judge Hanson signed the order of
dismissal.

Second, the letter dated December 9, 1975 and

filed December 12, 1975 from Plaintiffs1 counsel to the
court clearly indicated he was ready for trial nanytime
during the months of February or March, 1976".(R.90)

Third,

Plaintiff had completed extensive discovery (two sets of
interrogatories and one set of requests for admission).
(R.8,12,52)

Fourth, a proposed pre-trial order by Plaintiffs

was on file (R.65-70) as well as Plaintiffs1 requests for
jury instructions.(R.71-89)

Fifth, the court had indicated

on December 15, 1975 that the court would contact the
counsel to set a trial date (R.91) which was never done.
Sixth, the case was simply not that old.

The complaint was

filed January 22, 1974, and because of a change in venue,
the answer was not filed until six months later.

The cases

in which this Court have affirmed dismissals for want of
prosecution have generally involved much longer delays.
for example:

See

Brasher Motor v Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461

P.2d 464 (1969) five and one-half years, Thompson Ditch
Company v Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973) five
years. Maxfield v Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975) was only a
two year case, but therein the Plaintiff had conducted
either minimal or no discovery of his own, was dilatory in
responding to Defendantsf interrogatories and showed up for
trial without an essential expert witness.
In the case at bar there are no factors showing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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excessive dilatory conduct by Plaintiffs1 counsel.

During

the ten months between the vacating of the July 30, 1975
trial date and the filing of Defendants1 motion to dismiss,
the case was basically dormant.

There is no compelling

excuse for such a delay other than Plaintiffs' counsel was
awaiting action by Defendants' counsel and the court toward
resolving the question of the pre-trial order and a trial
setting.

Plaintiffs' counsel did not appear at the June 21,

1976 hearing immediately before the court signed its order
of dismissal (counsel did, however, inform the court he
would submit the matter on the pleadings).

Other than the

foregoing, all delays were the fault of the Defendants or
the court.
Even so, Plaintiffs maintain there was sufficient
activity in the file to avoid a motion to dismiss.

Granting

such a motion, especially with prejudice, is a harsh sanction
to be used sparingly.

The court below could have adequately

protected its interests by ordering Plaintiffs to bring the
case to trial by some day certain.

Such orders are commonly

used and are an attractive method of clearing up clogged
calendars without denying a party his day in court.
The Plaintiffs had, on June 29, 1975, submitted a
proposed pre-trial order and proposed a meeting to resolve
any questions within the order.(R.64)

That meeting was

never held.
The court had indicated to counsel by its minute
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entry on December 15, 1975 (R.91) that they would be contacted
regarding a new trial date.

That was never done.

Plaintiffs' counsel had attempted to move the
matter to trial with dispatch and resolve the apparent
dispute regarding the pre-trial order.

Neither Defendants'

counsel nor the court moved in that direction.

The Plaintiffs

should not be penalized for the failure to act of the court
or Defendants' counsel.
In sum, the lower court abused its discretion in
granting Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution
under the circumstances of this case.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE.

The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
Plaintiffs' claim with prejudice because such action excessive
penalized the Plaintiffs.

The Statute of Limitations has

not run on Plaintiffs' claim whether it be viewed as a
forcible entry action (four years - U.C.A. §78-12-25), an
action to recover possession of real property (seven years U.C.A. §78-12-5) or an action for injuring personal property
(three years - U.C.A. §78-12-26).

Proper respect for the

Plaintiffs' constitutional right to a judicial resolution of
their claim (Utah Constitution, Article I, §11) would mandate
that a court dismissing for lack of prosecution do so without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prejudice when the statute of limitations has not run on the
claim.

VI

<

CONCLUSION

The lower court abused its discretion in dismissing
Plaintiffs' claim for want of prosecution.

*

The lack of

prosecution was on the part of Defendants' counsel and the
court rather than Plaintiffs.

The decision of the lower

court should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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